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I. Introduction
When an inventor applies to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) for a patent, there are legal and procedural requirements to the
prosecution1 of that patent. One such requirement is the citation of similar
inventions and patents that might enable, narrow, preclude, or otherwise
relate to the patent currently being filed. Patent examiners subsequently
review the patent application, any accompanying diagrams and
descriptions, and any inventor cited prior art. Additionally, examiners may
(and often do) attach further relevant citations to these applications.
Empirical evidence, as well as common sense, suggest that patent
examiners, assigned to parse through and assess the validity of patents, are
overextended, and can devote only a relatively small amount of time and
effort to the review of each individual patent. Thus, applicants, if they are
so-inclined can choose to either overwhelm or underwhelm the examiner
with lengthy and burdensome prior art citations, knowing full well that
adequate attention will not be given to this bibliography.
This paper empirically evaluates the extent to which inventors either
over, or underwhelm the patent office with information. This data is then
channeled into an analysis of the effect of behavior upon the time from the
filing of the patent to the eventual successful granting of that patent. Given
the lack of available data on unsuccessful patent applications, as well as the
fact that the overwhelming majority of patent applications are eventually
successful, this paper focuses on time to patent, as opposed to deterministic
outcome.2 Here, time is taken as a proxy for depth of analysis and scrutiny
by a patent examiner. The paper performs two discrete analyses. First, this
paper presents a careful analysis of the relationship between patent
examiner citations and the amount of prior art cited by the applicant at the
time that a patent is applied for. This analysis yields that the two statistics
are inversely related. Specifically, the less prior art that is cited by the
applicant, the more prior art the examiner eventually includes during
prosecution. This association indicates that underwhelming the patent
officer indeed leads to increased labor on behalf of patent examiners.
In light of this first analysis, a careful tabulation and discussion of the
time to approval relative to the quantity of prior art cited is performed to
create a foundational understanding of the extent to which this

1.
2.

Prosecution here refers to the process of applying for and receiving a patent.
See FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT
LAW
AND
POLICY
217
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (stating that the proportion of patent
applications that are eventually approved is potentially as high as 98%).
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overwhelming and underwhelming is impacting the time to receive a
patent– a proxy for thoroughness. Empirical results indicate that while the
time spent on examination increases with increased applicant citations, it
does so marginally. This result taken in conjunction with the inverse
relationship between applicant citations and examiner citations leads to the
conclusion that applicants are better off citing little or no prior art, as this
ensures that the examiner will spend more time searching for prior art, and
less time evaluating the merits of the claims presented.

II. Literature Review
Empirical examination of the process of patent application has
increased substantially in accord with the increasing amounts of data made
available by the USPTO.3 The process of patent application obliges
inventors to report any relevant inventions or discoveries that predate the
inventors’ own, through citations to prior art.4 Prior art citations are then
evaluated by a patent examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in
order to determine whether the invention is novel enough to merit patent
protection.5 The preclusive effect of prior art citations, therefore,
incentivizes inventors to conceal this information, either through overciting, and attempting to bury the information, or by under-citing, and
hoping that the patent officer will not find the relevant information in
independent queries. Prior art citations are disaggregated into two
categories: (i) applicant citations—prior art cited by the inventor or
applicant, and (ii) examiner citations which are provided by the patent
examiner during the process of patent approval. Prior art citation has been
discussed extensively throughout the literature, and has long been one of
the primary areas of research in patent law.6 Much of the literature focuses

3. See Bhaven Sampat, When Do Patent Applicants Search for Prior Art?,53 J. L. &
ECON. 399 (2010); see also Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and
Patent Office Outcomes, 94(3) REV. ECON. & STATS. 817 (2010); see also Bronwyn H. Hall &
Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the
U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32(1) RAND J. OF ECON. 101 (2001); see also Jean O.
Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes & Jonathan Putnam, How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual
Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46(4) J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 405
(1998).
4. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE, Vol. 9 § 2121 (9th ed. March 2014).
5. See id.
6. See Note, Prior Art and in the Patent Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 369, 372 (1959)
(discussing prior art, the standard of evaluation, and instances in which patents are not granted as
a result of prior art conflicts).
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on the importance of applicant cited prior art on examiner behavior.7
Research has also suggested that citations to prior art8 may be an indicator
of patent value.9
Building upon the model of backward citations as indicators of patent
value, Hall et al. use the stock market valuation of the intangible assets of
patent-holder corporations to intuit the value of these companies’
intellectual property.10 Under this metric, self-citations made by the
applicant are a better predictor of patent value than are examiner citations;
specifically, a one unit increase in the number of self-citations for all
patents owned by a firm yields a 3% increase in that firm’s market value.11
Hegpe and Sampat find that the opposite conclusion holds relative to the
private value of patents.12 Namely, examiner citations are a stronger
predictor of the value ascribed to inventions by the inventors. Irrespective,
this association of value and citations makes clear the importance of prior
art citation in the literature, as well as practically.13
The value of patents—private, as well as public—underscores the
importance of the process of approval. Patent prosecution is an extremely
high-stakes field, and backward citations have a substantial impact on the
value.14 Accordingly, inventors, research companies and law firms all have
an interest in the implications of prior art citation. The importance of
citations is tied intrinsically to the relationship between the examining
officer, and increased patent applications. There is a growing sentiment
that the USPTO is increasingly overwhelmed by the growing influx of
patent applications; in comparison to the stagnation of resources

7. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 2 (2010).
8. Also commonly referred to as “backward citations,” as opposed to forward citations,
which account for an issued patent being cited by newer patents.
9. See Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of
Innovations. 21 RAND J. OF ECON. 172, 185 (1990).
10. See Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent
Citations, 36 RAND J. OF ECON. 16–38, (2005).
11. See id. at 34.
12. See Deepak Hegde & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Citations, Applicant Citations and the
Private Value of Patents, 108 ECON. LETTERS 287, 289 (2009) (discussing where private value is
taken to mean the likelihood of patent renewal by an inventor; and thus the value to the inventor,
as opposed to the market).
13. See id.
14. See Dietmar Harhoff, Fredricm. Scherer & Katrin Vopel, Citations, Family Size,
Opposition and the Value of Patent Rights, 32(8) RES. POL’Y. 1343 (2002) (showing that
references to prior literature are positively correlated with patent value).
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apportioned to the office.15 Sag and Rohde discuss the current shortcomings
of the patent approval process.16 In particular, they point out that the
USPTO suffers from a severe dearth of resources and also from distorted
incentive schemes.17 They propose a theoretical economic model devised to
explain why poor examination leads to negative public utility outcomes.18
Thus, they posit, insufficient or inadequate patent examination stymies
innovation, as it creates inventor reticence to challenge deficient patents.19
It would seem, then, that inventors’ over- or underwhelming examiners
with either cumbersome quantities of prior art citations, or a complete
dearth of prior art, lends itself to this same implication. Hence, the
temporally determinative effects of patent applicant citations have a
bearing on the socially unproductive approval of meritless patents.
Commensurate with the concerns of patent officers being
overwhelmed by applications generally, is the concern that patent
examiners lack the time, resources and capabilities to seek out prior art in
the absence of some direction by the inventor.20 The literature has thus far
focused on the proportionality of prior art citations by examiners relative to
inventors.21 Empirical evaluation has shown that applicants often contribute
an overwhelmingly low proportion of the prior art present in the final
application.22 In fact, approximately 40% of patent applications contain
only examiner citations, and no applicant citations.23 Yet, research also

15. See Douglas G. Lichtman & Mark A Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 51 (2007) (pointing out that patent examiners are overwhelmed by
the influx of patent applications); see also Brian Fung, Inside the Stressed-Out, Time-Crunched
Patent Examiner Workforce, WASH. POST (July 31, 2014) available at http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/31/inside-the-stressed-out-time-crunched-patentexaminer-workforce/; see also U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years, 1963-2013, USPTO,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (showing the
increasing uptick in patent applications filed year-over-year).
16. See Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 1, 16 (2007).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 22-28. This model takes into account the cost and outcome of subsequent
litigation relative to the cost of licensing.
19. See id.
20. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 15.
21. See Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Patent Applicants Search for Prior Art?, 53 J.L. &
ECON. 399 (2010); see also Juan Alácer, Michelle Gittleman & Bhaven Sampat, Applicant and
Examiner Citations in U.S. Patents: An Overview and Analysis, 38 RES. POL’Y. 415, 416 (2009).
22. See Sampat id. at 402.
23. See Alácer, Gittleman & Sampat, supra note 21, at 416.
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suggests that this dearth of applicant citations is largely irrelevant, as
examiners generally do not rely on these citations.24
Yet, the bulk of the research on prior art citations focuses on examiner
versus applicant cites, and the impact on the value of patents.25 While
studies point to the importance of prior art citations in the discussion of
overwhelming patent examiners, no research to date has examined the
effect of backward citations on the time spent examining patents. An
evaluation of the effect of prior art citations on the time for approval would
corroborate intuitions regarding the overwhelming of patent examiners.

III. Theory and Model
While research has pointed out the importance of backward citations,
and has speculated that this contributes to the overwhelming of patent
examiners at the USPTO,26 no research to date has analyzed the temporal
effects of either overwhelming or underwhelming patent examiners with
prior art citations. By either grossly over- or under-citing to prior art in a
patent application, an inventor might effectively shift the onus of searching
for or researching preclusive art onto the patent examiner. Inventors (or
more likely, law firms prosecuting patents) are likely fully abreast of the
fact that the patent office and its examiners are overworked and underresourced. Thus, strategically, applicants have an incentive to conceal any
prior art or research that might undermine the probability of receiving a
patent. This can be done either by willful omission of potentially
preclusive prior art—or more frequently, a failure to cite any prior art. It
can also be achieved by over-citing prior art, and forcing the examiner to
mine through the sources listed—many of which are tangentially, if at all
related to the invention submitted to the USPTO.
This strategic method of backward citation should lead to less
preclusive prior art being discovered by examiners. And, therefore, patent
applications which either under- or over-cite to existing inventions are less
likely to be blown up during the approval stage. This then implies that
patents with little innovative value-added will be more likely to be granted.
Further, as patents are afforded the presumption of validity27 once

24. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent
Citations Matter, 42 RES. POL’Y. 844, 854 (2013) (pointing out that this failure to heed applicant
citations is magnified by the fact that examiners are not well adapted to seek out non-patent prior
art).
25. See Alácer, Gittleman & Sampat, supra note 21, at 416; Hegde & Sampat.
26. See supra note 15.
27. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 1306 (9th ed. 2009) (the presumption of validity is “[t]he
doctrine that the holder of a patent is entitled to a statutory presumption that the patent is valid
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approved, potentially thin patents can preclude actual innovation.28 Once a
patent has been issued, potential competitors will have to factor in the
added hurdle of litigation when determining whether or not to enter a
particular market.29 Thus, patents which should never have been afforded
protection might preclude more robust innovation, as future litigation must
defer to decisions made by over-burdened patent examiners.
A. Examiner Citations as a Function of Applicant Citations

This paper performs a two-part analysis in order to determine the
effect of over- and under-citation. First, the paper examines the extent to
which the quantity of examiner citations is a function of the number of
applicant citations. This question looks to the effect of inventors’ or
applicants’ behavior on patent examiners. Prior to an analysis of the
temporal implications of applicant citation, the effect on the examiner is
warranted.
1.

Hypothesis: Examiner Citations Vary Inversely with Applicant Citations

Intuition suggests that patent examiners must provide more citations
for [applicant] citation deficient applications. Thus, examiner citations will
increase in inverse proportion to applicant citations. If this is the case, this
suggests that much of patent examiners’ time is being used performing
research and citing to prior art. This has implications for subsequent
analysis, irrespective of the effects of applicant citations on time required to
patent. The model for this inverse relationship can be observed in the
equation below:

Here, Examiner represents the number of citations provided by the
examiner, Applicant represents the number of applicant citations provided
with the initial patent application, and X corresponds to a control vector.
This control vector contains data regarding the number of claims present in
the patent application (a measure of complexity), forward citations—the

and that the burden is on the challenger to prove invalidity.” Thus decisions made by oftoverworked patent examiners are afforded a statutory presumption in subsequent litigation).
28. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 15, at 72 (2007) (suggesting that the granting of a
higher burden of proof once patents are granted stymies innovation, given that patent examiners
are over-utilized and do not posses the requisite resources to properly evaluate patents, or to
discern which patents are potentially valuable versus those that are not).
29. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26(3) AMER. INTEL. PROP. L. ASSOC. Q. J. 185 (1998); see Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19(2) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75 (2005).
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number of times that the patent is cited as prior art in subsequent patent
filings (a measure of eventual importance of the patent), and the year in
which the patent is issued (a de facto control for time).
In the event that the above hypothesis is not corroborated by the data,
this provides evidence that overwhelming is taking place. If patent
examiners are providing the similar amounts of prior art (or perhaps more)
when more prior art is cited by the applicant, this suggests that either (i)
applicants are citing erroneous prior art, (ii) examiners are essentially
starting from scratch with each application and ignoring prior art citations
by the applicant, or (iii) some combination of the two. Thus, this analysis,
too, would provide important insight regarding the strategic benefit of
overwhelming. Irrespective of the result of this preliminary analysis,
subsequent analysis of the effects of citation on the time to prosecute the
patent is necessary to contextualize the results.
B. Time to Patent Approval as a Function of Applicant Citations

After examining the extent to which examiners adjust their behavior
relative to applicant citations, analysis proceeds to the time to patent
approval from date of filing as a function of the number of applicant
provided citations. The first analysis purports to explain the extent to
which patent examiners are adjusting behavior in response to applicant
gamesmanship. The model for this second analysis is seen in the equation
below:
In this equation, Patent Time represents the time (in days) from the
initial application up to the time that the patent is granted. Applicant, as in
the equation above, represents the overall number of applicant citations
provided in the patent application. And again, as above, X represents the
control vector, containing data regarding the number of claims present in
the patent application, forward citations – the number of times that the
patent is cited as prior art in subsequent patent filings, and the year in
which the patent is issued.
The implications of this research question have a bearing on both
practitioner strategy and on policy. If little temporal variation is observed
across examiner citations, there is a clear incentive toward strategically
over- or underwhelming the examiner.30 If significant variation is observed,
this too has practical implications. Such a finding shifts the calculus to a

30. Note, also, given the compensation scheme for most law firms, practitioners will have
an incentive to bill more hours, and thus to spend time overwhelming, as opposed to
underwhelming.
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balancing of interests: patent applicants will have to calculate the risk of
not receiving a patent, relative to a delay in the time to approval. Under
this rubric, a cash-strapped, infant company with a valuable patent will
likely cite in a manner apt to promote the most expedited process of review,
with less concern for the viability of the patent. Whereas, a corporation
with deeper pockets can afford to wait longer to roll out a product.31 From a
policy standpoint, this analysis provides concrete evidence as to the extent
that patent examiners are overworked. If time to approval is taken as an
appropriate proxy for the amount of time spent examining a patent, the
variation in filing periods across applicant citations will provide insight as
to whether there is increasing, decreasing or fixed marginal thoroughness
of examination. Further, to the extent that applicants are engaging in
strategic backward citation, this result should grab lawmakers’ attention.
Such strategic opportunities stand opposite the overarching goal of Patent
Law—“[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”32
1.

Primary Hypothesis: Time to Patent Approval Does Not Differ Greatly
Across Applicant Citations

Intuitively, if patent examiners are overworked, then they have a
limited amount of time to apportion to all patent application reviews.33
Thus, they should spend approximately the same amount of time examining
patent applications, irrespective of complexity or the quantity of prior art
citations. Provided that this hypothesis holds true, applicants have a clear
incentive to obscure the search for prior art, and to make the process of
review less straightforward to the examiner; no matter the relevance of
applicant citations, examiners will spend the same amount of time
reviewing the application. Moreover, given the statutory presumption of
validity afforded to approved patents, patents are significantly harder to
invalidate once granted.34 Thus, all patent applicants have a strategic
incentive to over- or under-cite. In so doing, the applicant turns the
application process into a de facto rubber stamp, which is then afforded
increased protection in subsequent litigation. Moreover, this strategic
incentive is magnified for inventors of patents less likely to pass muster.

31. Though, as mentioned above, the presumption of validity likely mitigates this balancing
test.
32. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33. See supra, note 15; see also Jon W. Dudas, The Patent System: Today and Tomorrow,
Speech Before the Subcomittee on Intellectual Property (Apr. 21, 2005) (pointing to increasing
patent applications and the resulting constraint on examiner resources as a result).
34. See Lichtman & Lemley supra, note 15.
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If this hypothesis holds true, it provides empirical validation to the
criticism that patent officers are overworked. It also shows that there is a
clear incentive for inventors, research companies and the legal firms
prosecuting a patent to engage in strategic gamesmanship; a problem which
merits statutory consideration—or, at a minimum, larger resource
apportionment to the USPTO.
2.

Alternative Hypothesis: Time to Patent Approval Differs Across the
Quantity of Applicant Citations

In the event that the above result does not follow from the analysis,
and the time from initial filing until approval does in fact vary with the
quantity of applicant citations, this result, too, has implications for
practitioners as well as policy-makers. On the one hand, if time to approval
increases with applicant citations, there is a question of whether this
increases proportionally, or at a decreasing marginal rate. In either case,
this increased time of review will lead to strategic decision-making by
inventors looking to file for patent protection. However, in the event that
the time to review decreases with increasing citations (or with no citations),
this would suggest either (i) that examiners become more resigned when
they receive no initial citations, or (ii) that more applicant citations is a
self-selecting measure, and implies a more robust application which thus
requires less time to review. No matter the implication, the outflow will
again be strategic over-citation to dissuade examiners from laboring over
the approval process.
Regardless of the results of this analysis, the association of the
quantity of applicant cited prior art and time to patent approval has
implications for practitioners as well as policymakers. That patent officers
are overworked and that the majority of patents are eventually approved is
well documented.35 However, little empirical evidence or exploration exists
to corroborate these notions. Thus, this paper seeks to fill an important gap
in the empirical literature surrounding prior art and its role in the process of
patent application.

IV. Data
This paper utilizes two discrete datasets compiled from information
released by the USPTO. The first dataset is comprised of metadata from

35. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 19, (suggesting that patent examiners are
overworked, leading to the need for reform to the presumption of validity); see also Bronwyn H.
Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System–Design Choices and
Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989 (for a useful discussion of definitional issues
related to the term “patent quality”).
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US utility patents issued from 1975 until the end of 2010.36 This data is a
compilation of patent characteristics, including filing date, date of issue,
number of claims, and number of backward as well as forward citations for
patents published from Jan. 1, 1975, to Dec. 31, 2010. This data was
assembled from the “front page” data for issued patents and consists of
information on 3,995,847 patents spanning 109 years.37 It was extracted by
Bhaven Sampat from the USPTO’s Casis BIB Patents DVD.38
The second dataset utilized in analysis makes a distinction between
different types of citations. In 2001, the USPTO began demarcating
citations as either examiner citations or as applicant citations, in order to
“better consider whether changes are required to the rules governing prior
art statements.”39 This second dataset, too, was compiled by Sampat from
publicly available information provided by the USPTO.40 This data set
contains the variable of interest for this paper. The final dataset used for
analysis was created by augmenting the 1975 to 2010 bibliographic dataset
with the newer data containing information regarding examiner citations.
Because this data is limited to patents approved from 2001 to 2010, the
data analyzed in this paper was limited to these patents only. Taken
together, this final dataset includes the time of publication, the patent
number, the number of claims, the quantity of forward citations,41 the
quantity of examiner citations and the quantity of applicant citations for
each patent. In total, this dataset documents 1,643,596 patents granted
across 9 years, with application dates extending as far back as December 15,
1944.

36. See Bhaven Sampat, USPTO Patent and Citation Data, HARVAD DATABASE
NETWORK (Sept. 3, 2012), http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/16412UNF:5:ERqPZ7
enbwBRimghqDD4gQ== BhavenSampat[Distributor]V4[Version].
37. The earliest filing date is 1911.
38. See Sampat, supra note 24 (note, see codebook explaining the dataset).
39. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1302.html.
40. Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Citation Data, HARVARD DATABASE NETWORK (Aug.
6, 2011), http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18735UNF:5:mKUxLoeuskOler9Lq8l7cw==
BhavenSampat[Distributor]V2[Version];
41. Note, the number of forward citations is (expectedly) right-skewed toward older
patents, given that more recently issued patents have been published for less time, and therefore
will not likely be drawn upon as heavily.
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V. Analysis
A. Examiner Citations as a Function of Applicant Citations

Prior to regression analysis, qualitative examination was performed on
the data to visually evaluate for trends. The first relationship analyzed is
that between examiner citations and applicant citations. A scatterplot of the
two variables provides a fairly clear portrayal of the relationship between
the two variables. Note that, given the enormous size of the dataset—
1,643,596 patents—scatterplots of the dataset in its entirety are unfeasible;
as such, all scatterplots are comprised of a 1% sample (or 164,360) of the
patents in the overall dataset. Figure 1 displays the scatterplot of the
relationship between examiner and applicant citations. As hypothesized,
there is a [visually discernible] inverse relationship between the two in the
shape of a hyperbolic function. Repeated iterations of this plot with
differing random samples confirmed this general trend. This figure
indicates that the quantity of examiner citations appears to increase when
the quantity of applicant citations is low, and decrease as applicants cite
more data. This association implies that patent examiners are forced to
spend more time on prior art searches and citations when the applicant opts
to underwhelm the USPTO with prior art.
Building on this graphical representation, the inverse of applicant
citations was generated. Subsequently, utilizing the statistical modeling
package curvefit yielded that an inverse relationship did in fact exist.42
Ordinary least squares regression of this function was then carried out.
Table 1 tabulates these coefficients. Regression (1) confirms that there is a
significant inverse relationship between the two.43 This effect indicates that
the marginal impact of an additional applicant citation is a reduction of the
quantity of prior art cited by the examiner. Regressions (2) and (3) confirm
this effect. Indeed, as more control variables are introduced, the effect
actually increases slightly—meaning that the deleterious effect on examiner
citations of each marginal applicant citation is magnified. Thus, there is
strong empirical validation that applicant citations are inversely associated
with the quantity of examiner citations; and, accordingly, with the amount
of time spent in examination.

42. Liu Wei, “CURVEFIT: Stata module to produces curve estimation regression statistics
and related plots between two variables for alternative curve estimation regression models,”
Statistical Software Components S457136, Boston College Department of Economics (2010),
revised 13 Apr 2013; Note, in this instance the inverse of the number of applicant citations was
generated and then tested against the number of examiner citations using the linear OLS model.
43. It is important to bear in mind that all figures are apt to be statistically significant in the
analysis of such enormous data. Overpower aside, analysis indicates that this relationship is
significant at the 99.99999% level.
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In order to provide context for this analysis, it is necessary to
understand the extent to which inventors and applicants provide citations.
Figure 2 illustrates that the large majority of patent applicants cite little or
no prior art in patent applications. Nearly 40% of applicants provide no
references;44 and, the mean number of citations is 10.5. Coupled with the
inverse relationship presented above, this implies that many if not most
patent examiners spend the bulk of their time searching for relevant prior
art. This is a task which—given the broad range of inventions that flow
through the Patent Office each day—examiners are significantly less
equipped to discover than are inventors specializing in a narrow field.
Given that examiners are spending more time on citations (or are at
least adding in more citations of their own) when applicants cite less prior
art, the question shifts to whether or not applicants are spending grossly
different amounts of time on applications based on the amount of prior art
cited. If the USPTO is spending significantly more time on patents with
fewer citations, this undermines the importance of the above result. If the
USPTO were to take more time to approve patents with fewer applicant
citations, this would merely reflect the increased time spent on providing
more examiner citations. If, however, the time to patent approval did not
vary greatly across the quantity of applicant cited prior art, then this would
suggest that applicants who cite less prior art (and thus shift this burden
onto the examiner) are deflecting attention from the merits of their patent
application and are forcing the examiner to search for a “needle in a
haystack,” so to speak; instead of spending time evaluating the substance of
the patent application.
B. Time to Patent as a Function of the Quantity of Applicant Citations

The analysis of the temporal effects of strategic applicant prior art
citations then carries significant weight. In order to ascertain specifically
how to model the data, again, graphical representation was utilized. Figure
3 presents a scatterplot of the time from initial filing until patent approval
against the quantity of prior art cited by the applicant. This chart illustrates
a seemingly flat trend with select extreme values. Given these extreme
values for the time to patent, a log transformation appeared appropriate.
Applying this transformation to the dependent variable and re-plotting
yielded Figure 4. Figure 4 provides a slightly more discernible trend. Once
again, applying the curvefit package to this data, a log-linear relationship
was confirmed. This model is seen in Figure 4 as an overlay.

44. See supra, note 16 (this result comports with the findings of Alcier et al., indicating
external validation for these results).
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Imposing a regression upon this log-linear relationship gave Table 2.
Regression (1) delineates a positive, significant relationship between the
number of applicant citations and the time between filing and approval.
However, this effect is extremely small: 0.08%. Placing this result in
context, this implies that for each additional prior art citation provided by
an applicant for a patent, the time to approval increases by less than one
one-thousandth of the overall time taken in the patent process. Applying
this margin to the average time to receive a patent—1098 days, or almost
exactly 3 years—each additional citation provided increases the time to
receive a patent by 0.94 days. Even by adding 100 applicant citations, the
increase in time spent examining would be only 9.4 days. Which, given the
overall length of time spent in examination, is relatively trivial.45 By adding
in additional controls, this already small effect is nearly wiped out entirely,
regressions (2) and (3) show that the effect becomes negligible as more
controls are applied.
That the time to patent increases with the quantity of prior art
citations, albeit negligibly, in fact bolsters the claim that underwhelming
the Patent Office is associated with an examiner spending a larger
proportion of the time allotted to patent evaluation on finding and citing to
prior art. And, to the extent that this task is mutually exclusive of
substantive evaluation of the claims of the application, this has the effect of
less deserving patents being afforded protection. It should, however, be
noted that this result is not inconsistent with intuition: that higher quantities
of applicant citations imply a higher degree of complexity, and therefore a
prolonged period of review. Yet, this impact is theoretically controlled for
by the inclusion of the number of individual claims in the application (a
proxy for complexity). Indeed, the inclusion of this variable, and other
controls has a deleterious effect upon the size of the coefficient.
Regression (3) presents a minimally impactful effect of applicant citations
on the time required for patent approval.

VI. Conclusion
The results of this analysis indicate (1) that patent examiners cite
significantly more prior art when applicants provide less (which is often),
and (2) applicants spend nominally more time on patents with more
applicant cited prior art. Taken together, this implies that though
examination time varies little with increased applicant citations to prior art,
the quantity of examiner citations varies greatly. So too, then, does the
time required of the examiner to provide these citations. And, since the
45. Adding an additional 200 citations, corresponds to only an 18.8 day increase. Though,
adding 1000 additional examiner cites yields a less negligible 94 day (3 month) delay.
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time spent in the approval process appears relatively fixed across applicant
citations, applicants who purposefully omit prior art stand to gain by the
examiner spending a larger share of this examination time seeking out
relevant prior art.
Thus, applicants who under-cite or fail to cite any prior art stand to
gain from decreased attention to the merits of their patent application. This
effect is magnified for applicants of particularly weak patents. Moreover,
given the strength of the presumption of validity, these patents are likely to
be upheld in subsequent litigation, and also to preempt innovation more
deserving of protection. Further, this analysis suggests that though the time
to approval increases with applicant citations, it does so only marginally.
This result lends weight to the conclusion that the USPTO is severely overworked and under-resourced, and is applying a “one-size-fits-all” approach
to the process of patent approval, apportioning approximately the same
amount of time to all patents, regardless of their innate complexity.
In order for these conclusions to be strengthened, further research is
necessary. In particular, it would be useful to understand the amount of
time required of an examiner to cite prior art. It is possible that given the
state of patent application, examiners have become particularly adroit at
quickly finding and listing relevant prior art. Additionally, it is of interest
the extent to which this process of searching for prior art overlaps with
substantive evaluation of patents. It is indeed possible that in searching for
prior art, examiners perform much of the diligence that they would
otherwise perform in evaluating the patent. Though, it stands to reason that
at least some time is wasted (i.e., the time wasted in finding unrelated
patents). Notwithstanding, these conclusions have reaching implications for
applicants, practitioners and policymakers. The current structure of the
USPTO incentivizes applicants to shirk the task of citing to relevant prior
art. This burden-shifting distracts examiners from their actual task of
evaluating patents on their merits. Given the patent office’s justification for
providing increased availability to examiner citation data, the PTO should
take note of this phenomenon of under-citing and take the necessary actions
to mitigate its impact.
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B. Tables

Table 2. Log-Linear Regression of Time to Patent
on the No. of Applicant Citations
(1)
(2)
(3)
ln(Tim e to Patent)ln(Tim e to Patent)ln(Tim e to Patent)
0.00086
0.00064
0.0000668
(1.21e-05)
(1.20e-05)
(1.10e-05)
0.0116
0.0139
(7.11e-05)
(6.52e-05)
0.0038
0.00331
Num ber of Claims
(2.72e-05)
(2.50e-05)
0.00166
Num ber of Forward
(3.81e-05)
Cites as of
0.000877
Prim ary U.S. Patent
(3.12e-06)
class as of 12/31/10
0.00017
Issue Date
(3.46e-07)
6.871
6.744
3.643
Constant
(0.000409)
(0.000720)
(0.00586)
Observations
1,643,596
1,643,596
1,638,694
R-squared
0.003
0.031
0.208
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: All statistics are significant at a level in excess of p<0.000001.
VARIABLES
No. of Applicant
Citations
No. of Examiner
Citations

